Communism and the meaning of social memory: towards a critical-interpretive approach by Cristian Tileaga (1253946)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
	   1	  
 
 
Communism and the meaning of social 
memory: towards a critical-interpretive 
approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cristian Tileagă 
Discourse and Rhetoric Group 
Department of Social Sciences 
Loughborough University 
Loughborough 
UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   2	  
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
Using a case study of representations of communism in Romania, the paper 
offers a sketch of a critical-interpretive approach for exploring and engaging 
with the social memory of communism. When one considers the various 
contemporary appraisals, responses to and positions towards the communist 
period one identifies and one is obliged to deal with a series of personal and 
collective moral/political quandaries. In their attempt to bring about historical 
justice, political elites create a world that conforms more to their needs and 
desires than to the diversity of meanings of communism, experiences and 
dilemmas of lay people. This paper argues that one needs to study formal 
aspects of social memory as well as “lived”, often conflicting, attitudinal and 
mnemonic stances and interpretive frameworks. One needs to strive to find 
the meaning of the social memory of communism in the sometimes 
contradictory, paradoxical attitudes and meanings that members of society 
communicate, endorse and debate. Many of the ethical quandaries and 
dilemmas of collective memory and recent history can be better understood 
by describing the discursive and sociocultural processes of meaning-making 
and meaning-interpretation carried out by members of a polity. 
 
Keywords: communism, nostalgia, Romania, critical-interpretive approach, 
social memory, ‘lived’ ideology 
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Inserting a meaning occurs constantly … while every existing thing calls for 
something, and it is not enough to say simply: it is … Past events also call for 
a meaning, as it is difficult to stop at one word, simply saying they were    
(Czeslaw Milosz). 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Using a case study of representations of communism in Romania, the 
paper offers a sketch of a critical-interpretive approach for exploring and 
engaging with the social memory of communism. In this context, “critical-
interpretive” refers to and reflects an eclectic epistemological and theoretical 
approach to social memory informed by insights from social psychology (Billig 
et al., 1988; Billig, 1996; Middleton and Brown, 2005, 2007; Tileagă, 2009) 
and the interpretive sociology of Alfred Schütz (Schütz, 1964, 1967). When 
one considers the various contemporary appraisals, responses to and 
positions towards the communist period (both official and vernacular) one 
notices that they all seem to point towards a personal and collective moral 
and political quandary first identified by Adorno: “one wants to get free of the 
past … one cannot live in its shadow’ but the ‘past one wishes to evade is still 
so intensely alive” (1986: 115). I focus here on the condemnation of 
communism in Romania in the Tismăneanu Report (Tismăneanu et al., 2007; 
Tismăneanu, 2008) and public positive evaluations of the communist period, 
what is usually broadly referred to as “nostalgia for communism” (see, inter 
alia, Velikonja, 2009; Willinger, 2007; Todorova and Gille, 2010; Ekman and 
Linde, 2005). 
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A critical-interpretive approach to social memory suggests that the 
quandaries, dilemmas, and difficulties of forging (elite and personal) relations 
to the recent past can actually be explored in their own right (see also Tileagă, 
2011, in press, a and b). Social memory cannot be studied outside of the 
social and cultural contexts in which it originates. What underpins such 
contexts are language practices, a variety of meaning-making and meaning-
interpretation (Schütz, 1967) practices. It is through language practices that 
both academic experts and lay people give meaning to social memory and 
construct representations of (troubled) recent history.  
A critical-interpretive approach to social memory rests on three basic 
assumptions.  First, one needs to be able to describe the circumstances (e.g., 
political, sociocultural, discursive) under which social memory becomes a 
public affair: how does ‘memory’ actually ‘matter’ to people (Brown, 2008; 
Campbell, 2008; Middleton and Brown, 2007). This entails treating social 
memory as a relational phenomenon and understanding it in terms of the 
‘interaction of multifarious interests and world views’ (Olick, 2007: 187-188). 
Second, interpretations and understandings of the recent past (particularly, 
the legacy of communism, individual and national evaluations of the period) 
are as much a concern of professional academics (historians, political 
scientists, sociologists of transition) as they are for ordinary people. One 
needs to be able to chart how personal and societal meanings (in face-to-face 
and small group interactions to the use of the official (memory) apparatus of 
nation-states) are created, circulated, and disseminated. The study of social 
memory in new democracies needs to take seriously into account the 
‘contestability’ (Connolly, 1993) of social and political categories (e.g., 
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‘revolution’, ‘communism’, ‘democracy’, etc.). Social and political categories 
(and attributes attached to them) are sources of dispute and moralizing and 
they may mean different things to different people. A third assumption that 
guides my argument is that examining social memory requires the recognition 
of the tension between “intellectual” and “lived” ideology (Billig et al., 1988). 
Billig et al. distinguish between “intellectual” ideology as formal (academic), 
systematic and systematized philosophy and “lived” ideology as common 
sense and everyday meaning-making and meaning-interpretation practices 
(see also Millstone, this issue).  Social memory does not simply reflect nor 
expresses “a closed system for talking about the world” but rather “contrary 
themes, which continually give rise to discussion, argumentation and 
dilemmas” (Billig et al., 1988: 6). The formulation of an argument, 
representation, or attitude towards the recent communist past presupposes 
that counter-arguments, counter-representations or counter-attitudes are not 
only possible, but are the very make-up of how personal and societal 
meanings are created, sustained and circulated in society (Billig, 1996).   
The paper argues that any attempt to understand debates, ethical 
quandaries and politics of social memory in eastern Europe should treat 
memory as social product reflecting the tension and mutual influence of 
“intellectual” (scientific) and “lived” (common-sense) meanings, “reified” 
universe of scientific inquiry and scientific knowledge (especially that of 
historical and political sciences), and the “consensual” universe of lay 
representations and forms of knowledge (and memory) that produce the 
content of common sense (cf. Andrews, 2007;  Marková, 1997, 2004; 
Marková et al., 1998; Moscovici, 2007; see also Jovchelovitch, this issue and 
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Knights, this issue).  
 
SOCIAL MEMORY AND NATIONAL NARRATIVES 
 
Nations are “imagined communities” of memory and forgetting (Billig, 
1995). There is something called “public” or “national memory”, which is not 
something we just “have” or “own”, but rather something we “create” 
(Andrews, 2003) from the historical “big narratives” of the national group and 
the “little narratives” of individuals (Rowe et al., 2002): national memory and 
national narratives are a (contested) terrain where “official culture” and 
“vernacular culture” meet (Bodnar, 1992). National memories participate in the 
ongoing, unfinished identity project of the national collective. A variety of 
public forums such as public commemorations, museums, monuments, truth 
commissions, and so on, mediate conflict and negotiation in “the social and 
political sphere … of ‘memory politics’ … and are carried out in the service of 
providing a usable past that serves some identity project” (Wertsch, 2007: 
650). The problem is how one decides, “how a set of events should be 
emplotted into a storyline?” (Wertsch, 2011: 27). Also, who gets to decide this 
and in whose interest? (Wertsch and Karumidze, 2009). Existing shared 
national narratives or “narrative templates” (Wertsch, 2002, 2008) have an 
important role in shaping collective interpretation and memory. 
From post-apartheid South Africa to post-communism in eastern 
Europe, national narratives around the recent past have mediated both 
empowering and progressive as well as limiting and conservative 
representations of recent history, identity projects and political action. 
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Narratives around national historical events have not only liberated people 
from under the sway of oppressive regimes but they have also “unearthed 
complicated narrative ways of mnemonic reconstruction and construction” 
(Brockmeier, 2010: 10). Although there is usually a stark emphasis on 
“narratives” and “narratives templates” as mediators and generative tools of 
collective/social memory, these represent only one dimension of appraising 
the social memory of the recent past. There is also a strand of social 
psychological study of collective memories of socio-political events (cf. 
Pennebaker et al., 1997) concerned with the role of cognitive, emotional and 
social factors in individual and collective memory formation. Dialogical 
(Markova et al., 1998) and discursive/textual (Tileagă, 2009) concerns with 
collective memory, as well as concerns with identifying the various roles and 
functions collective representations of history serve (Liu and Hilton, 2005) 
have added significant insights.  Sociologists, but especially historians and 
political scientists have approached collective memory with a concern of 
documenting and explaining macro-social political and historical processes of 
change and transformation. In contrast, anthropologists, ethnographers and 
some cultural historians have pointed to the moral ambiguities and vagaries of 
memory that often stem from the idea that the memory of social and historical 
“realities” can be placed by academics, politicians, ordinary citizens, and so 
on within different social frameworks and networks of interpretation (Bucur, 
2009; Gallinat, 2009).  
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UNDERSTANDING (THE LEGACY OF) THE RECENT PAST: THE 
CONDEMNATION OF COMMUNISM 
 
Twenty years after 1989 issues of remembering and forgetting are still 
dominant concerns in post-communist countries in eastern Europe (especially 
among public intellectuals and politicians). The fall of communism and 
transition to democracy has put eastern European societies in the position of 
needing to fashion and give an account of themselves and their recent, often 
tumultuous transformation. The various manifestations (successes and 
failures) of a politics of memory in eastern Europe (positions and debates on 
the nature and function of democracy, justice and reconciliation with the past, 
trials, amnesties, laws of condemnation, etc.) point to the vagaries and 
difficulties of a clean and ultimate break with the recent communist past (Stan, 
2006; Waśkiewicz, 2010; Galasińska and Galasiński, 2010; Petrescu and 
Petrescu, 2007; Tismăneanu, 2008, 2010c).   
The various attempts at official, normative interpretation of recent 
history (based on the opening and access of archives of the communist 
regime, oral testimonies, memoirs of former political prisoners, dissidents, 
etc.) were setting the frame for political and moral reflection and action around 
how to take communism into public consciousness, arguably the greatest 
political, epistemological and ethical challenge of post-communist states. The 
essence of official attempts at “mastering” and “coming to terms with” the 
communist past (and also the key difficulty) was to get society “to come to a 
common mind” (Taylor, 2004: 91), to propose and ratify a moral and political 
vision of (retrospective) justice around a normative “morality tale”1. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 One of the problems for elite discourse (politicians, historians, political scientists) was how to 
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ultimate aspiration of official attempts at representing recent history was to 
provide a rational and synthetic, unified, social memory, to generate non-
controversial (historical) knowledge and truth-telling perspectives capable of 
overriding lay, individual experiences or perspectives. The main (self-
assigned) task of the historian or political scientist is to construct a 
representation of the recent past by uncovering “the facts about the past” and 
recounting them “as objectively as possible” (Skinner, 2002: 8).  
The collective relationship of eastern European societies to their recent 
history, the struggle with seeking and generating (active and transformative) 
knowledge of the past has meant engaging, creating and managing 
(emerging) social representations of values and attitudes towards the recent 
past. It has also meant asking the question: how does one tell the ‘story’ of 
communism? How many stories of communism can one tell?  
The role of politicians and professional academics was to ensure that 
official representations of the communist past set the moral agenda of the 
present, shape a moral public discourse and sensitize present generations of 
their responsibilities to the past. The “Tismăneanu Report” (henceforth the 
‘Report’) condemning the crimes and abuses of communism in Romania 
(1945-1989) was such an attempt (for more details on the structure and scope 
of the Report (see Tismăneanu, 2007a, 2008); for reactions to the Report, see 
Ciobanu, 2009; Cesereanu, 2008; Hogea, 2010; Stan, 2007; Ernu et al., 
2008). The leading author of the Report was Professor Vladimir Tismăneanu, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
get others to participate in a general vision of justice and “moral identity” (Gergen, 2005: 116) 
within the national community. In order for society to come to a “common mind”, the ordinary 
citizen needs to be first “convinced by the proposed conception of justice before … 
consensus can come about” (Habermas, 1995: 122). 
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an internationally renowned expert (political scientist and historian) of 
communism. The Report consists largely of an account of communism’s 
political methods and institutions. It aims to convey the repressive and 
criminal nature of totalitarian society and give an exhaustive account of 
communism as self-perpetuating political system. In December 2006, in front 
of the Romanian Parliament, the Romanian President Traian Băsescu, 
officially condemns the crimes and abuses of the Communist regime.  
The Tismăneanu Report was at pains to construct a practical 
framework for the inquiry as a matter of public concern. This was achieved 
through making reference to a broader framework of political reconciliation 
and transitional justice and as responding to a public concern over public and 
political responsibility in relation to the past. The public concern and necessity 
of condemning Communism was legitimated through a combination of 
repertoires of (knowledge) entitlement (‘the right to know’), obligation and 
moral accountability, and laying the basis for a moral/political public judgment 
around the relevance and significance of uniquely bound features of 
Romanian communism: ‘illegitimate’ and ‘criminal’ (see 1-3) (for more details 
on how the Report constitutes a practical framework for the inquiry as a 
matter of public concern see Tileagă, 2009).  
(1) “Condemning communism is today, more than ever, a moral, intellectual, 
politic, and social duty/obligation. The democratic and pluralist Romanian 
state can and ought to do it. Also, knowing these dark and saddening pages 
of 20th century Romanian history is indispensable for the younger generations 
who have the right to know the world their parents lived in”  
 
 
(2) “Against the facts presented in this report, it is certain that genocide acts 
have been committed during 1945–1989, thus the communist regime can be 
qualified as criminal against its own people”  
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(3) “‘Taking act of this Report, the President can say with his hand on the 
heart: the Communist regime in Romania has been illegitimate and criminal”  
 
 
According to the Report, communism cannot be defined in terms of 
characteristics that are accidental, but rather in definite and deliberate terms 
that may provide the support for an explanation of the nature and motivation 
of the communist totalitarian system. The attributes ‘illegitimate’ and ‘criminal’ 
do more than describe communism, “they place it in a class of objects, 
thereby suggest with what it is to be judged and compared, and define the 
perspective from which it will be viewed and evaluated” (Edelman, 1970: 131). 
By emphasising the criminality and illegitimacy of communism, the Report 
creates, affirms and legitimates a narrative for an ethics of memory: social 
remembering transmits responsibilities (Poole, 2008) and is an obligation for 
the community (Thompson, 2009).  
Weighing the legacy of the past (“setting the record straight”) is limited 
to a discrete field of knowledge production and transmission where “opinions 
are based upon warranted assertions … judgments are not mere guesswork 
or loose suppositions” (Schütz, 1964: 122). For instance, the coordinator of 
the Report, Vladimir Tismăneanu, can write: 
 
“For me, as historian and political scientist, the verdict of such a commission 
was not needed in order to argue that ‘communism has been an aberrant 
system, criminal, inhuman’”. (Tismăneanu, 2007b) 
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The grounds for preferring and subsequently championing a particular 
way of construing the meaning of communism are given by an academic 
‘community of agreement’ and taken-for-granted knowledge arising from 
disciplinary/academic adherence. In this context, a description of the nature of 
the communist authoritarian regime is carrying ‘its own interpretation, its own 
truth’ (Friedlander, 1992: 7). Nonetheless, as Todorov suggests,  
“the study of history can never totally ignore the values that permeate human 
existence  … If historians are going to further their understanding, to collect as 
many facts as possible and formulate the most accurate interpretations, then 
they must not decide ahead of time what morality they want to see in the end. 
History comprises very few pages written in black and white only” (2009, p. 
89-90).  
 
Although seemingly capturing the essence of communism as political 
ideology, arguably, the Report does not seem to be directly concerned with 
“social reality in its full concreteness, that is, as experienced by the social 
actors themselves in their daily lives” (Schütz, 1975: xxix). There is an 
inherent tension present in any attempt to constitute a unitary and coherent 
version of the past. The hallmark of creating and reproducing social memory 
in the public sphere is represented by a “dogmatic commitment to one – and 
only one account of the past” (Wertsch, 2002: 125). A process of 
“canonization” of a unique representation of recent history requires that 
alternative experiences, perspectives, interpretations are actively suppressed. 
The political and academic desire is that of accounting “without rest”, giving 
the full and definitive description and assessment of communism.  The Report 
attempts to create an official narrative of communism which in and of itself 
limits any conceivable counter-accounts or alternative positions. The Report 
pays less attention to questions which are as important: Can issues of 
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retrospective justice really be “fixed for all time” (Teitel, 2000, p. 104)? What 
the Report seems to underplay is that “setting the record straight” is “a value 
at all levels of individual and social existence, not just at the level of science 
or scientific history” (Carr, 2008: 135). The meaning of the social memory of 
communism within a framework of transitional justice is on one hand 
determined by the history of past persecution, but also by subjective 
dimensions of interpretation and struggle between scientific and lay meaning-
making and meaning-interpretation practices.  
Beyond the “community of agreement” provided by historical and 
political science, official national narratives can prove problematic. The 
adoption of a moralizing voice and factual descriptions does not guarantee 
that the different social and political actors from across the political spectrum 
will join this community of agreement. This is because it is usually believed 
that facts speak for themselves. The description of communism (“illegitimate 
and criminal”) do not speak by themselves. As Jenkins argues, “all facts to be 
meaningful need embedding in interpretative readings that obviously contain 
them but which do not simply somehow arise from them” (1991: 33). “Self-
sufficient” (LaCapra, 2001) professional research endeavours are most 
effective in shielding official ideologies and images from the impact, 
contradictions, and paradoxes of memory and everyday meanings, from 
alternative ways of deriving and socially approving knowledge of the recent 
past. They are effective in shielding official representations of recent past from 
various individual attempts at challenging public “master narratives”, official 
versions of the past (Andrews, 2007). Hannah Arendt expresses this cogently: 
“the modes of thought and communication that deal with truth … are 
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necessarily domineering; they don’t take into account other people’s opinions” 
(Arendt, 1977: 241). An approach based on “anamnestic solidarity” with the 
suffering of past victims and a perspective on recent history that relies on 
public moral and rational discourse in the present is sometimes not enough. 
The process of creating official political narratives usually informs or 
accompanies political process and supports national identity projects (Olick, 
2007). Nonetheless, this is process that can prove entirely insensitive to 
alternative social meanings and ways of constructing visions of the recent 
past. Although the Report does offer crucial insights into the nature and 
motivation of the communist regime, it fails to take fully into account that 
creating and maintaining (normative) narratives of social memory is 
essentially an uncompleted intersubjective (dialogical, rhetorical, 
argumentative) undertaking.  
To describe communism as “illegitimate” and “criminal” is both “to 
describe it and to ascribe a value to it or express a commitment with respect 
to it” (Connolly, 1993: 22). Every historical event, social formations and social 
structures transmit “an excess and surplus that might sabotage the historian’s 
carefully chosen criteria of judgment” (Cohen, 2006: 200). Arguably, 
communism was not just an external ideological order governing or 
influencing the behaviour of elites and population. Communism was, for most 
people, “lived reality” (Bucur, 2009; Gallinat, 2009), and essentially 
“incommunicable” to those who have not lived it (George, 2011). When the 
professional historian of eastern Europe, or sociologist of transition describes 
the communist social and political order, he or she is describing a social 
object that has previously been defined, described, by lay social actors 
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(Watson, 2009: 1). It can be argued that the bulk of knowledge adduced to 
construct representations of communist recent history consist of an interplay, 
mixture of experiences and insights that originate in a) the immediate 
experiences of Communism (communicated from one individual to the other); 
b) the immediate experiences of communism/events of those who have 
experienced Communism in a ‘unique or typical context of relevance’ (Schütz, 
1964: 132) that is substantially different from that of ordinary individuals (e.g. 
political prisoners, (former) members of the nomenklatura, (former) members 
of the Secret Police, and so on); and c) a very specific way of conceiving the 
experience of the past, one that relies on what Alfred Schütz has termed the 
epoché peculiar to the scientific attitude (the province of historians and 
political scientists), which is seen as independent of the previous two. Of 
course, this typology does not exhaust the innumerable experiences, and 
modalities of experiencing communism2. This is merely a point that relates to 
the broader issue of what particular aspects of lived experience shape the 
formulation of what it means to “come to terms with the past”.  Lived 
experience, and narratives that support it, have profound consequences for 
retrospective and prospective worldviews around morality, justice, 
personhood, etc. It should not come as a surprise that the activation of certain 
moral and political tensions within a society: ‘us’ and ‘them’ (e.g., ‘former 
communists’ vs ’democrats’), different political parties and social groups, were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 To this one can add the shared social representations of social and political realities 
understood as ‘cultural spaces’ of negotiation of societal meanings (Tateo and Iannaccone, 
2012) that encapsulate tensions between ‘immediate’ experiences of communism and 
experiences triggered by cultural, social and political cues in the present. It could be argued 
that this distinction (although potentially problematic) works in resonance with another 
distinction (operated by both researchers and ordinary people) between ‘official’ and 
‘unofficial’ spheres of experience and social practice - see, for instance, Fitzpatrick’s (2000) 
work on ‘everyday Stalinism’. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.  
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(and are still) grounded not only in political interest and power structures, but 
also in ‘lived’ experience, and various narratives, standpoints, that arise from 
it, in the different ways in which communism was actually experienced3.  
The different ways of conceiving the experience of the past seem to be 
tied to a notion of communism understood as a “reality” that is already socially 
constituted and distributed in ‘documentary’ form (Smith, 1974). There is a 
“reality” of communism which is prior to the contemporary official version of 
events; it is a “reality” contained into the records, files, and other forms of 
systematic collection of “information”’ (Smith, 1974: 261) of the regime. 
Communism is also a confessionally constituted knowledge incorporated into 
various types and kinds of witnessing and testimonies, and various others 
public sources of memory4.  
 
POSITIVE PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND NOSTALGIA FOR COMMUNISM 
One of the most striking (but perhaps least surprising) aspect of 
coming to terms with the past in eastern Europe is that the official reckoning 
with the communist past and the reinforcing anti-totalitarian views has not 
inevitably contributed to an attachment to democratic values and attitudes and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I do not wish to suggest that “lived” experience is all there is. I do not wish to suggest that 
“everything goes”. “Lived” experience is a domain of social life, a unique, peculiar, 
foundational realm. It is also a social tool for accomplishing very specific personal and social 
goals. For instance, appeals to “lived” experience support both progressive and retrograde 
(revisionist) aspects of social memory. The “voice” of the victims is lived experience, as was 
the work of the Securitate operatives. Memory and experience work as recursive processes 
that manage the tension between stability of meanings and change, continuity and innovation. 
4 It is not from historians and political scientists that most people get their knowledge of the 
past, but rather from “lived experience” and manifestations of popular culture: novels, 
newspapers, magazines, politicians, public personalities, and so on. One tends to underplay 
the importance of public sources of memory and the role of “memory consumers who use, 
ignore, or transform” memories and public artefacts “according to their own interests” 
(Kansteiner, 2002: 180).  
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to an indivisible consensus around a (moral) national narrative and 
representation.  
 
”the legacy that usually proves most difficult to handle is not so much 
institutional as attitudinal. Views of politics change after a dictatorial 
experience either through aversion or disillusionment. This produces 
sometimes a withdrawal from politics or in other cases either points of conflict 
or, on the contrary, a desire for avoiding them … At a deeper level, mentalities 
from the authoritarian era may well affect notions or perceptions of 
'democracy'” (Pridham, 2000: 49-50).  
 
 
Various public opinion polls/surveys in eastern Europe reflect the 
“attitudinal legacy” to which Pridham refers. It is usually expected that, all 
other things being equal, “within the boundary of the nation, agreement should 
exist on the moral valuation of the collective memory even if the particular 
justifications differ” (Fine, 2001: 22; see also Wertsch, 2002). Yet what one 
notices is a striking and intriguing contemporary phenomenon: positive public 
evaluations/perceptions of the communist period, what is usually broadly 
referred to as ‘nostalgia for communism’ (Ekman and Linde, 2005; Todorova 
and Gille, 2010; Velikonja, 2009; Willinger, 2007). Positive public perceptions 
of communism are usually seen as “paradoxical”, “bewildering”, “mind-
boggling”, “bizarre” and “ambivalent”; these perceptions question and throw 
into doubt consensual official/elite expectations around a shared moral 
national valuation of the social memory of communism.  Some researchers 
have gone so far as to suggest that the highly contested nature of memory, 
issues and intensity of debate around coming to terms with the past (e.g. 
‘decommunization’/’lustration’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘condemnation’ of communism), 
the bewildering ambivalence towards the recent past in the public sphere, 
indicate the presence of a “trauma of collective memory” (Sztompka, 2004: 
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183; see also Kattago, 2009 on attempts to construct a unified European 
memory of trauma). “Traumas of memory” are seen as the effect of polarized 
public opinion, of society not coming to a “common mind” about issues of 
national interest. The notion of “trauma” conjures an image of a divided public 
sphere where agreement cannot be achieved solely through the “public use of 
reason”, where all “citizens” participate, and which lend “moral convictions 
their objectivity” (Habermas, 1995: 124).  Within the context of ambivalence 
towards communism, “coming to terms with the past” as an individual and 
group attitude is turned into a social problem, one that requires explanation:  
How is it that people can regret the communist regime? How can people just 
ignore its criminal and oppressive legacy? How can one explain “nostalgia for 
communism”?  
Nostalgia has moved from being an accepted and “acceptable 
catchword for looking back”, a “pervasive, bitter-sweet feeling not yet taken 
too seriously” (Lowenthal, 1989: 18-19) to “topic of embarrassment and a term 
of abuse” (p. 20; see also Pickering and Keightley, 2006). For Susannah 
Radstone, for instance, nostalgia is not the outcome of some social process, 
but rather “point of departure, opening out into … questions of knowledge and 
belief, temporal orientations and cultural … politics that it condenses” (2010, 
p. 189). Nostalgia is both a “generic”, explanatory category and a description 
of a temporal orientation, veiled desire and search for a “simple and stable 
past as a refuge from the turbulent and chaotic present” (Lowenthal, 1989: 21; 
see also Boym, 2001).   
In eastern Europe, nostalgia (especially in relation to communism) is a 
term heavily imbued with political and ideological significance. It has been 
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argued that “communist nostalgia is … a multidimensional phenomenon” 
(Ekman and Linde, 2005, p. 370) and cannot be easily apprehended within a 
single framework. For some, “nostalgia for communism” is a very serious 
matter: it risks falsifying the past and threatens a democratic future. It is 
nonetheless considered “misleading to suggest that … ‘nostalgia’ amounts to 
anti-democratic feeling’ (Pridham, 2000: 51). Communist nostalgia 
“encompasses more than just non-democratic principles” (Ekman and Linde, 
2005, p. 371). Nostalgia in general and nostalgia for communism in particular, 
embodies progressive, regressive, utopian stances, and signals a longing for 
an idealized past (Pickering and Keightley, 2006). 
For some researchers of post-communism, the presence of nostalgia 
as a social phenomenon is given by the “intriguing” results of “public opinion” 
polls. Through their emphasis on anonymity and abstractness, surveys and 
public opinion polls are designed and used as instruments of deriving social 
and scientific knowledge. From this perspective, nostalgia is “accepted and 
treated as though it were an objective reality to be discovered by polling or 
otherwise” (Edelman, 2001: 53).  Velikonja (2009) offers some examples of 
various public surveys conducted in different countries in eastern Europe that 
show ‘nostalgic’ stances towards the recent communist/socialist past. In 1999, 
50% of Slovakians considered the former socialist regime to be ‘better than 
current democracy’. In the same year, in Russia, it was found that 85% of 
Russians regret communism and Soviet Union’s demise. In 2004 the figure 
fell to 74%. In 2002, 56% of Poles were telling opinion pollsters that life ‘was 
better before’. In 1995 and 2003, 88% and respectively, 86% of Slovenians 
considered life in the former Yugoslavia, as ‘good’ and ‘very good’. More 
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recently (2009) 72% of Hungarians, 62% of Bulgarians and Ukrainians, 60% 
of Romanians, 45% of Russians, 42% of Lithuanians and Slovaks, 39% of 
Czechs, 35% of Poles declared they were worse off than during communism. 
There are different factors that are seen as triggers and explanations of the 
onset and manifestations of nostalgia for communism in eastern Europe: 
“passive escapism … of people who cannot adapt to new conditions”, 
“general discontent”, “personal memories of life under communism”, a way to 
“fill up the legitimation deficit of contemporary societies”, “resistance strategy 
of preserving one’s personal history and group’s identity against the new 
ideological narratives” (cf. Velikonja, 2009). Ultimately, nostalgia for 
communism reflects and expresses a “retrospective utopia … a wish and a 
hope for the safe world, fair society, true friendships, mutual solidarity, and 
well-being in general” (Velikonja, 2009: 547-548).  
Recent Romanian polls5 have identified striking paradoxes of opinion 
and memory: 44% of participants declare that communism was “a good idea, 
but applied wrongly”. 45% consider that they would have had a “better life if it 
wasn’t for the revolution”. 52% believe that the “problem of access to 
Securitate dossiers is not important”. 83% consider they “have not suffered 
under communism”. Although 50% believe that “it was better before” 
December 1989, 41% do consider that the communist regime was “criminal”; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A major opinion poll was conducted by CSOP (in collaboration with The Institute for the 
Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of Romanian Exile 
(http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/en/about_iiccr) under the title ‘Attitudes and opinions on 
the Romanian communist regime’. Data was collected between 22nd October – 1st November 
2010. The report is available at http://www.csop.ro/index.php?act=media&op=view&id=13 
[accessed January 2011]. Two opinion polls were conducted by IRES (the Romanian Institute 
for Evaluation and Strategy), one under the title ‘Romania: Twenty one years since the 
Revolution’ in the period 19th -21st December 2010 and the other one, ‘Romanians and 
nostalgia for communism’ in the period 21st – 23rd July 2010. Reports are available at 
www.ires.com.ro [accessed January 2011] 
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Although more than half of Romanians consider that communism was a 
repressive regime, only 13% of them consider they have “suffered” under 
communism. Although more than half of Romanians consider that access to 
Securitate files is unimportant, a vast majority think that those who have 
collaborated with the secret police should not occupy public posts6.  
A recent Soros foundation study/poll (Bădescu et al., 2010) looking at 
the civic and political engagement of Romanian teenagers found that 38% of 
respondents considered the communist period “better” than the present state 
of affairs. 72% of the teenagers that took part in the study declared 
themselves to be “not satisfied” with the achievements of the current regime in 
comparison to the communist period, especially in relation to “respect for law”. 
Also, 57% considered that people had “better lives” in communism. For the 
authors of the study, the “origins of the positive valorization of communism 
seem to be located at the level of socio-economic frustrations in the medium 
in which teenagers grow up, defined narrowly (the family) or broadly (the 
school, the community)” (Bădescu et al., 2010, p. 65).  Political commentators 
who have lived through the “revolution” of 1989 distinguish between the 
moral/political views of their generation and that born after 1989, and can 
write: “our generation speaks a language that is increasingly very difficult to 
understand by the generations born after 1990”  (Tapalagă, 2011). Nostalgia 
is a tangible phenomenon. It can be detected, for instance, in the words of a 
Romanian sociology student: “the most regrettable aspect were the well-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I will not go here into a critique of the way these opinions polls were constructed, how the 
questions were designed, their error margins, and so on. Epistemological and methodological 
issues relating to opinion polls on perceptions of communism and social change require 
separate analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper. I rely here on reports and 
interpretations of opinion poll results made freely available to the wider public. 
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known queues … yeah, it was bad, but the international debt of Romania was 
paid. Now, in contrast to what happens to all of us now, we have increasing 
debts and I fear that we could return to how we were twenty or thirty years 
ago. This is my worst fear, not how it was then, but what will be … we 
shouldn’t repeat the past, the history of communism in a democratic 
Romania.” (apud Tapalagă, 2011) 
In the Romanian context, nostalgia for communism, and the range of 
contradictory opinions, are considered (and explained as) “a form of inertia”, a 
refusal, fear and “escape from freedom” (Tismǎneanu, 2010a), a “latent 
complaint” in relation to “present everyday frustrations” (Tismǎneanu, 2010b), 
a “normal phenomenon” linked to a “crisis of identity of Romanian people” and 
“dissatisfaction” with the current political class (Dâncu, 2010)7. For others, 
nostalgia for communism, and paradoxical opinions are seen as originating in 
and explained by a lack of elite management of social memory and a lack of 
information and individual insight, failings of memory, and deep confusion in 
ideas, values, perspectives:  
“the population lacks a sophisticated understanding of ‘suffering’ during the 
communist regime. One needs to explain, in order to make one’s own, the 
criminal nature of dictatorship … Perceiving yourself as a victim of a 
totalitarian regime entails a full understanding of the inner workings of the 
regime … there is a danger of creating a selective memory of communism, 
based primarily on personal experience and which disregards the repressive 
nature of the regime” (Iacob, 2010) 
 
Others contend, “it is unconceivable that after half a century of barbarism, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There are, of course, a variety of other functions that nostalgia fulfills. The analysis can be 
taken in the direction of ‘symbolic capital’ and coping with rapid social change; nostalgia as a 
reaction to attempts by elites to ‘impose’ hegemonic representations of the recent past; 
nostalgia as a specific stage in a ‘developmental’ sequence of self and (social and historical) 
context appraisal. It is, perhaps, also very much the case that people can combine both 
condemnation and nostalgia in their appraisal of the recent past, and such paradoxical 
amalgamation can be transmitted to the generations that do not share ‘immediate’ 
experiences of socialism. 
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penury, and censorship, people should tell us that they have not suffered 
under communism”.  
 
What “suffering” means is not treated as an everyday concern for 
social actors, something that may have different meanings, but rather a 
normative, pre-ordained “reality” of communism linked to the official memory 
of communism as barbaric and criminal towards its own people. Elite 
accounts (as opposed to vernacular ones) can be said to show “a desire to 
rationalize public life” by “placing a set of ambiguities and contestable 
orientations under the control of a settled system of understandings and 
priorities” (Connolly, 1993: 213). These accounts point not only to a normative 
conception of society, politics and morality (a normative representation of the 
recent past), but also to a conception of the person: empty-headed or 
muddled-headed, confused, providing an uncertain, unreliable, often 
misleading (and potentially immoral) account of what is, “in actual fact”, the 
“reality” of communism. Explanations of the broader phenomenon of nostalgia 
for communism and more specific contradictions of opinion seem to rely on a 
socially constructed (political and moral) imaginary of communism yet seem to 
paper over inconsistencies, ambiguities or contradictions (often explaining 
them away). One could argue that there is a sense in which “opinions 
regarding controversial issues are always ambiguous … they are often 
inconsistent or mutually contradictory … they are typically so volatile and 
subject to change with new cues. Only noncontroversial beliefs remain 
consistent and are not multivalent, but they do not become political issues” 
(Edelman, 2001: 55). Elite accounts also paper over the multiplicity of social 
frameworks of memory (Halbwachs, 1992), multiple realities, memories and 
meanings attached to communism as “lived ideology”. Such explanations fail 
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to accommodate the idea that ideology comprises contrary themes (Billig et 
al., 1988) and downplay the notion that “there are myriad means of describing 
‘what actually happened’, multiple stories, each felicitous within its own 
community of intelligibility” (Gergen, 2005: 117).  
More generally, these interpretations seem to downplay the idea that 
not all members of society “accept the same sector of the world as granted 
beyond question” (Schütz, 1970: 237). This can obscure the mediated nature 
of telling stories of communism and the variety of identity constellations and 
networks of interpretation (Bucur, 2009; Gallinat, 2009). Attitudes and 
memories towards the recent past are not given or pre-existing and then 
harvested with the help of opinion polls, but rather multimodal, circulating and 
circulated by active agents at various levels of social organization through the 
use of material/cultural tools (e.g. narratives, written records, and so on) (cf. 
Wertsch, 2007). If one takes seriously the idea that “it is the meaning of our 
experiences and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitutes 
reality” (Schütz, 1967: 230), then results of opinion polls (and vernacular 
accounts) present only apparent paradoxes. Positive public perceptions of 
communism, and generally, nostalgia for communism, signal a failure of a 
conception of “coming to terms with the past” where “the citizens mutually 
convince one another of what is just and unjust by the force of the better 
argument” (Habermas, 1995: 124). Although the contradictory results can be 
explained in psychological, sociological and political terms, the heart and 
nature of these contradictory standpoints is left untouched. Difficulties arise 
for opinion pollsters and commentators when wanting to attain “objective and 
verifiable knowledge of a subjective meaning structure” (Schütz, 1967: 36). 
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ANALYSIS TERMINABLE … AND INTERMINABLE 
A critical-interpretive approach proposes a broader epistemological and 
theoretical foundation for understanding of the social memory of communism. 
The range of (possible) meanings attached to communism and the political 
project of “coming to terms with the past” can be broad; the process of 
understanding can be very complex. One needs to acknowledge that contrary, 
contradictory, ambivalent standpoints and views are possible. Working with 
one description, “communism is illegitimate and criminal”, it is almost 
impossible to give justice to the variety of assumptions, individual and group 
frames of reference, situations and histories that are meaningful beyond any 
single description (Gergen, 2005). It is social actors themselves, and not 
contexts beyond them, their own orientations to personal and historical 
context that provide the social/cultural/political interpretive framework.  
The hope of linear, consensual, progressive national narratives 
(championed and fashioned through official representations of recent 
communist past) is upset by the unevenness, ambivalence, contradictory 
nature of individual positioning in relation to the recent communist past. The 
tension between the two positions engenders a social problem. This social 
problem is not just a temporary difficulty that a government or other official 
representative of the nation could resolve, for all time, through better and 
more comprehensive historical and political science inquiry; it is rather a 
consequence of an inability to incorporate and work with a perspective on 
social memory that highlights the “lived” character of ideology, the unfinished 
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nature and diversity of perspectives, attitudinal and mnemonic dilemmas and 
ambiguities. In undertaking to transform “old” vocabularies of repression into 
“new” vocabularies of democracy and freedom, to put things right and 
accomplish historical justice one constitutes a world that conforms more to 
one’s needs and desires (those of the historians and politicians) than to the 
diversity of meanings of communism, experiences and dilemmas of lay 
people. One needs to study both the formal production and reproduction of 
communism as political ideology as well as “lived”, often conflicting attitudinal 
and mnemonic stances and interpretive frameworks. This would be a first step 
towards dispelling the illusion of a linear relationship between accumulation of 
“positive” knowledge and moral/political transformation at 
institutional/group/individual level. It would be also a first step toward 
capturing the essence of socio-political dilemmas and paradoxes of memory 
and opinion in the public sphere as reflecting the work of social actors that 
creatively acknowledge, resist, question or transform social and political 
reality. Dilemmas and paradoxes of social positioning towards the recent 
communist past pose sometimes (insurmountable) problems for opinion 
pollsters and historical/political approaches to “coming to terms with the past” 
that are not ready to take fully into consideration that lay standpoints and 
meanings on the recent communist past are far from orderly, homogeneous 
and predictable. Researchers of communism and post-communism need to 
look beyond public opinion polls to analysing the actual social and 
argumentative context of forming opinions and viewpoints in relation to 
communism as socially constituted phenomenon that acquires very different 
meanings and interpretations for different people. The existence of 
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contradictory, ambiguous and paradoxical standpoints towards communism 
does not point necessarily to a lack (of knowledge or of insight) or 
forgetfulness, but rather to an essential characteristic of how common sense 
functions and is reproduced by social actors in society (Billig, 1996; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987); it points to the argumentative character of social life where 
holding opinions is fundamentally a process of argumentation and debate 
(Billig, 1996).  
It is believed that “telling the truth” about the past and making it public 
will enlighten people and change perceptions. If one can only find the “right” 
words to describe the past, its nature (essence) will “reveal” itself to everyone. 
Telling the truth about the past is also an attempt to stifle and “control” returns 
of “negative currents” (revisionist accounts, nostalgia), to bring the 
“repressed” oppressive ideology and effects of communism into 
consciousness, thus banishing the risk (and fear) of repetition (Freud, 1937). 
In trying to understand both positive and negative aspects of coming to terms 
with the past in eastern Europe one should perhaps acknowledge that facts of 
history can be known scientifically, but only through “progressive 
approximations to a reality that is never completely attained” (Chesneaux, 
1978: 45-46). There is no “natural end” to understanding the recent past; 
there is no ultimate story. There is always the danger that “a historical 
phenomenon clearly and completely understood and reduced to an 
intellectual phenomenon, is for him who has understood it dead” (Nietzsche, 
1980: 14). 
As argued in the Introduction of this paper, one needs to be able to 
describe how recent history and social memory become a public affair, how 
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does “memory matter” (Brown, 2008; Campbell, 2008). A critical-interpretive 
perspective suggests that creating a national memory of communism should 
perhaps no longer start with accepting the meaning of communism as “ready-
made and meaningful beyond all question” (Schütz, 1967). This position 
should not be seen as denying the significance and overall social value of the 
ways in which historians, political scientists, sociologists, approach the issue 
of coming to terms with the recent communist past. Historical knowledge of 
the objective (ideological) makeup of political regimes and other social 
formations should be continually sought as a remedy for half-truths, political 
manipulation or simply ignorance. Yet, such knowledge, used and reproduced 
as a “matter of fact”, is arguably inadequate with regard to the handling of 
dilemmas and ambiguities of social memory or to the development of broader 
social scientific frameworks of analysis. One needs to strive to find the 
meaning of the social memory of communism in the sometimes contradictory, 
paradoxical attitudes and meanings that members of society upheld and 
negotiate, and not only in the official representations of recent history 
“compressed into generalities” (Veyne, 1984: 63). One should reveal 
idiographic as well as nomothetic aspects of social memory. The study of 
social memory and coming to terms with the past in post-communist societies 
must engage with the dialogue between factual truth and diversity of opinions, 
individual/subjective and official remembrances. Not all members of a national 
community will tell the same stories. A community of memory (and 
agreement/consensus) around the representation of recent history cannot be 
constructed and rendered meaningful if it is does not originate on a “shared 
memory”, one that can “integrate” and “calibrate” (Margalit, 2002) different 
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perspectives and stances.  
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